Abstract:We show that linguistic style is a systematic and previously overlooked attack surface for LLM safety. Across a diverse taxonomy of styles and multiple state-of-the-art models, stylistic rewrites of identical harmful goals produce order-of-magnitude differences in Attack Success Rate (ASR), with some styles achieving up to 80\% ASR while others remain below 6\%. To exploit this vulnerability, we introduce a lightweight single-pass attack framework that combines a style-conditioned generator with a BERT-based style selector, achieving performance competitive with substantially more expensive multi-turn optimization methods. To understand why style affects safety behavior, we conduct mechanistic analysis on LLaMA-3.1-8B and find that stylistic rewrites disrupt refusal representations while preserving recoverable harmful intent, suggesting a distributed failure mode rather than a single refusal mechanism. Motivated by this finding, we develop a style-aware Direct Preference Optimization defense that reduces ASR from 86\% to 19.5\% while largely preserving utility. Together, our results establish linguistic style as a critical factor in adversarial robustness and provide both mechanistic insight and a practical defense. Submission history Access Paper: View PDF HTML (experimental) TeX Source Additional Features Audio Summary Current browse context: References & Citations Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Bookmark Institution arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website. Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them. Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.
AI NEWS JOURNAL
arXiv cs.CLAI NEWS / JOURNAL
Jailbreak LLMs with Linguistic Style as a Hidden Attack Surface
arXiv:2611.18601v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We show that linguistic style is a systematic and previously overlooked attack surface for LLM safety. Across a diverse taxonomy of styles and multiple state-of-the-art models, stylistic rewrites of identical harmful goals produce order-of-magnitude differences in Attack Success Rate (ASR), with some styles achieving up to 80\% ASR while others remain below 6\%. To exploit this vulnerability, we introduce a lightweight single-pass attack framework that combines a style-conditioned generator with a BERT-based style selector, achieving performance competitive with substantially more expensive multi-turn optimization methods. To understand why style affects safety behavior, we conduct mechanistic analysis on LLaMA-3.1-8B and find that stylistic rewrites disrupt refusal representations while preserving recoverable harmful intent, suggesting a distributed failure mode rather than a single refusal mechanism. Motivated by this finding, we develop a style-aware Direct Preference Optimization defense that reduces ASR from 86\% to 19.5\% while largely preserving utility. Together, our results establish linguistic style as a critical factor in adversarial robustness and provide both mechanistic insight and a practical defense.